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Abstract 
Is there a pecking order of cross-border investment in that countries become financially 
integrated through some types of investment rather than others? Using a novel database of 
bilateral capital stocks for all types of investment – foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
equity securities, debt securities as well as loans – for a broad set of 77 countries, we show 
that such a pecking order indeed exists. The paper focuses on two key determinants of this 
pecking order: information frictions and the quality of host country institutions. Overall, we 
find that in particular FDI, and to some extent also loans, are substantially more sensitive to 
information frictions than investment in portfolio equity and debt securities. We also show 
that the share as well as the size of FDI that a country receives are largely insensitive to 
institutional factors in host countries, while portfolio investment is by far the most sensitive to 
the quality of institutions. This provides new evidence in favour of some hypotheses but 
contradicts others put forward in the literature on trade in financial assets.  
1. Introduction 
The debate in the literature on trade in financial assets makes the important point that the 
type of foreign financing of cross-border investment may not pursue a random pattern, but 
follows a certain “pecking order” regarding the composition of capital flows. One key focus 
has been on the role of information frictions, with some important theoretical contributions 
arguing that portfolio investment should be more sensitive to information frictions than FDI or 
bank loans due to a lack of ownership control of the former (Razin, Sadka and Yuen 1998). A 
second important strand of the literature has concentrated on the role of institutions in 
influencing the composition of cross-border investment (Albuquerque 2003; Wei 2000a), with 
the empirical work still being inconclusive on which types of capital are most affected by the 
institutional environment. 
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 The main contribution of the paper is to test empirically for the existence of such a pecking 
order and to identify its determinants in a bilateral country-pair setting. We concentrate on 
two determinants that have been central in the literature on trade in financial assets: the role 
of information frictions, and the role of institutions as drivers of cross-border investment. The 
paper builds on several seminal studies. In particular, Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) show that 
information frictions for a number of countries indeed exert a larger effect on portfolio equity 
and corporate debt than on government bond flows with the United States. The present 
paper is complementary to this as well as other studies, but innovates in a number of ways. 
First, using a novel dataset on bilateral holdings, the present paper is the first that includes 
all types of capital, ie also FDI and other investment/loans, and thus allows for a systematic 
comparison of all types of investment in the capital account. This is an important difference 
because especially FDI and loans are the dominant types of investment received by many if 
not most emerging markets and developing countries.
1
Second, the empirical analysis covers 77 countries and thus is much broader in scope 
through addressing the issue of cross-border investment also from an emerging market 
economy (EME) perspective. This allows us to investigate and indeed empirically confirm 
that the effect of information on cross-border investment exhibits a sizeable asymmetry 
across countries, exerting a larger influence on EMEs. Third, our empirical methodology is 
distinct from most of the literature through building on the trade literature on the border effect 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Cheng and Wall 2005) which stresses the importance of 
including source and host country fixed effects and shows that the exclusion of such fixed 
effects may generate a sizeable estimation bias. 
Our empirical results show that information frictions have a substantial effect on the pecking 
order as we find that FDI and loans are the most sensitive and foreign portfolio investment 
(FPI) equity and FPI debt securities the least sensitive types of investment to information 
frictions. For instance, the distance among country pairs has a 1.5 to 2 times larger impact 
on FDI stocks than on equity securities and debt securities. Similarly, we find loans to be as 
sensitive as FDI to information asymmetries, thus confirming and being in line with the 
literature on the capital structure of firms which has emphasised the special role of loans and 
their sensitivity to information (Myers 1984; Bolton and Freixas 2000). We use various 
proxies for information frictions – distance, the volume of bilateral telephone traffic, bilateral 
trade in newspapers and periodicals, and the stock of immigrants from the source country in 
the host – showing the robustness of this result to alternative specifications. While these 
empirical findings are new, we also confirm some of the existing findings, in particular that 
equity portfolio investment is not more sensitive to information frictions than debt securities 
(Portes, Rey and Oh 2001). Using our different econometric approach also reveals that the 
effects of information frictions tend to be larger than some found in the literature, though a 
precise comparison is impossible due to different country samples across studies. 
Regarding the second determinant – the impact of institutions on the composition of cross-
border investment – we make two key points. First, while many papers in the literature have 
focused on the effects of institutions on one or two particular types of capital flows, our 
analysis is the first to test for differences across all major components of the capital account. 
Our results show that portfolio investment is much more sensitive than FDI or loans to a 
broad set of institutional indicators, such as the degree of information disclosure in local 
credit market regulations, as well as accounting standards in the host country. Portfolio 
investment also reacts much more strongly to the risk of expropriation and repudiation costs, 
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even 76% of total foreign inward investment for EMEs. We discuss these issues in detail in section 3 of the 
paper. 
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 confirming the hypothesis put forward by Albuquerque (2003), who argues that portfolio 
investment is easier to expropriate than other types of investment. Other hypotheses of the 
literature are, however, not confirmed by our analysis. For instance, portfolio investments in 
particular, but also loans, decrease substantially with the degree of corruption. By contrast, 
the stock of FDI is found to be less sensitive to corruption, which is consistent with some 
findings in the literature (see Daude and Stein, 2004) but contrary to others (eg Wei, 2000a). 
Overall, portfolio investment, and in particular equity securities, appear to be the most 
sensitive type of investment to institutional factors. Our results prove robust to various 
alternative proxies of institutions and country samples. 
An additional point of the paper is that we also study the impact of financial market 
development on the pecking order of cross-border investment positions. We find that portfolio 
investment is substantially more sensitive to the degree of market openness and 
development than FDI or loans. For instance, capital account liberalisation and financial 
development change the composition of financial liabilities of a country by raising the share 
of portfolio investment substantially. Moreover, we find that the volume of FDI and loans is 
relatively insensitive to market developments as, for instance, capital account liberalisation 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the volume or stock of FDI or loans. This is 
in line with the evidence for capital flows of previous studies that use a different empirical 
strategy (see eg Montiel and Reinhart, 1999, Magud and Reinhart, 2005). 
The findings of the paper have a number of implications. The paper underlines the role of 
bilateral information frictions as a barrier to cross-border investment, in particular for FDI and 
loans. Importantly, the paper emphasises that FDI should not necessarily be seen as an 
unconditional blessing for host countries. We present evidence that the share of inward FDI 
and also foreign loans is highest for countries with weak institutions and poorly developed or 
badly functioning capital markets. Therefore, although FDI may have beneficial effects on the 
economy, a composition of foreign investment that is heavily tilted towards FDI is likely to be 
a signal of some fundamental weaknesses of the host country economy, thus providing 
support for the argument of Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) and Albuquerque 
(2003).  
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way. The next section provides a 
brief overview of the literature on the determinants of capital flows and the pecking order of 
cross-border investment. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology and presents the 
data, together with a number of stylised facts on cross-border investment. The empirical 
results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, including various robustness and sensitivity tests. 
Section 6 concludes and offers a short discussion of policy implications. 
2. Related  literature 
Information frictions have been at the core of the debate on international capital flows.
2 
Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) present a model that extends the pecking order argument 
from the corporate finance literature by Myers and Majlauf (1984) and Myers (1984) to 
international capital flows to analyse issues of capital taxation. In particular, they assume that 
FDI circumvents the informational problems completely, while portfolio debt and equity are 
subject to informational asymmetries where domestic investors observe the real productivity 
of the firm, while foreign investors do not. Therefore, FDI is the preferred form of financing in 
                                                  
2   Portes and Rey (2005) and Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) provide references and a discussion of the finance 
literature related to information frictions. Also, see Harris and Raviv (1991) for an earlier survey on the 
empirical corporate finance literature on information frictions and asset markets. 
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 the presence of information frictions, followed by portfolio debt and then equity. Neumann 
(2003) presents a version of lending with a moral hazard model by Gertler and Rogoff (1990) 
that focuses on the differences between international debt and equity financing. In contrast to 
Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998), she assumes that ownership, even in the form portfolio 
equity, conveys some control and therefore information on the investment. Assuming that 
monitoring costs are decreasing in ownership, the implied pecking order is that FDI and 
equity are less costly ways of financing domestic investment than instruments that do not 
convey some degree of ownership and therefore information, like loans or debt.  
Goldstein and Razin (2006) present a model that explains differences in volatility of FDI 
versus FPI through information asymmetries. Again the key assumption is that FDI implies 
ownership control of the firm and therefore more information than FPI. In addition, FDI is 
subject to a fixed cost in contrast to FPI. They assume that foreign investors are subject to 
privately observed liquidity shocks which drive down the price of selling the asset before 
maturity due to a standard “lemons” problem. Thus, there is a trade-off between efficiency 
and liquidity for foreign investors. Under these conditions, they show that in equilibrium, if 
production costs are higher in developed countries, developed countries will receive more 
FPI that developing countries, given that it would be less profitable to pay the fixed cost 
associated with FDI. Finally, Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003) present a similar model that 
predicts also that more countries with good corporate governance attract more FPI. While 
several of these theoretical models assume different sensitivity to information frictions across 
the different components of the capital account, it has not been tested systematically. Our 
paper tries to fill this gap in the literature.  
Despite limited empirical evidence, the perceived wisdom is that certain types of capital 
inflows are more beneficial for receiving countries than others. In particular, FDI is generally 
seen as a “good” type of capital because it may promote growth in host countries by 
encouraging a transfer of technology and knowledge and by opening market access abroad 
(eg Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997; Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998).
3 On the 
other hand, portfolio investment flows are considered to be more volatile, may exacerbate 
the magnitude of business cycles and also induce or at least worsen financial crises (eg 
Claessens, Dooley and Warner, 1995; Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi, 1998; Sarno and 
Taylor, 1999). 
Other papers have challenged the view of considering FDI necessarily as “good cholesterol” 
(eg Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 2000; Albuquerque, 2003). These papers show that 
actually the richest and least volatile economies, and countries with good institutions and well 
functioning markets, receive more FPI and relatively less FDI from abroad as a fraction of 
total capital inflows.  
Finally, the existence and functioning of markets are potentially an important determinant of 
foreign investment, and are closely linked to the effects of information asymmetries. If 
markets are absent or are functioning poorly, firms may have no other choice than to use FDI 
to carry out an investment project (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000). In this sense, 
FDI may function as a substitute for a functioning market mechanism. Thus, portfolio 
investment or bank loans may be preferred options for firms in an environment in which 
markets function well. In a broader sense, the quality of economic and political institutions is 
                                                  
3   For papers that find a positive and differential impact of FDI on domestic investment and economic growth 
compared to portfolio investments, see Bosworth and Collins (1999), Razin (2004), and Mody and Murshid 
(2005). However, the literature is not conclusive on the impact of FDI on growth or the channels through which 
it acts. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozkan and Volosovych (2004) find that FDI has a positive impact on economic growth 
provided that the domestic financial sector is sufficiently developed. Alternatively, Borensztein, De Gregorio 
and Lee (1998) find a positive impact of FDI in interaction with human capital. For some evidence of the 
effects of capital flow composition on currency crises, see Frankel and Rose (1996).  
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 an analogy to the functioning of markets. In a country where property rights are poorly 
enforced and the risk of expropriation is high, firms may prefer FDI as it is harder to 
expropriate due to its information intensity and its inalienability (Albuquerque, 2003). 
Moreover, different types of investment may react differently to factors such as the degree of 
corruption, the functioning of the legal system and transparency (eg Wei, 2000b; Faria and 
Mauro, 2004; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozkan and Volosovych, 2005; Papaioannou, 2005; Gelos and 
Wei, 2005). While several of these papers look at the effects on total capital flows, a specific 
type of flow, or the difference between portfolio and FDI, we contribute to the literature by 
analysing the effect of institutional variables on all major concepts of the capital account.
4 
Moreover, other important differences between the present paper and the existing literature 
are the focus on bilateral capital stocks as well as the methodological approach, which allows 
us to control for information asymmetries as well as for both source and host country factors. 
Finally, we also study the impact of financial market development on the composition of the 
capital account. 
3.  Methodology, data and some stylised facts 
This section gives an outline of the methodology and the main hypotheses for the empirical 
analysis (Section 3.1). The subsequent presentation of our data (Section 3.2) is then 
followed by a discussion of some key stylised facts of the pecking order of cross-border 
investment positions derived from our data (Section 3.3). 
3.1  Methodology and hypotheses 
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we attempt to understand the 
role of information frictions as a determinant of the pecking order of cross-border investment. 
The effects of information frictions are likely to be different across country pairs, ie one 
particular source country i may face a different degree of information costs and asymmetries 
vis-à-vis host country j than other source countries. For this purpose, we use a pseudo-fixed 
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with   as the holdings in US dollars of asset type k – where k = FDI, portfolio equity, 
portfolio debt securities, or loans – of residents of source country i in host country j; X
k
ij y
ij as a 
proxy of bilateral information frictions and additional controls; and   and   as source 





Given that in our first step we want to identify consistently the effect of information frictions – 
a pair-effect variable – we also need to control for all other relevant factors that affect the 
volume of bilateral investment from a particular source country by including source and host 
country dummies as well as other bilateral controls that are likely to affect the level of 
                                                  
4   While Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozkan and Volosovych. (2005) also test the effects of institutions on the capital account, 
their focus is on aggregate capital flows (defined as the sum of FDI and portfolio investment flows). Therefore, 
they do not include bank loans nor do they test or comment on differences among the different types of 
investment. As we will show below, we find this distinction to be important as different types of capital react 
fundamentally differently to information frictions as well as institutions. 




 In the second step, we try to explain the country fixed effects in order to 
understand which factors make host countries attractive places for investment.
6
The vector of coefficients of interest to us in this first step is  , ie we want to test whether 
different types of asset holdings have a different degree of sensitivity to various proxies of 
information frictions X
k β
ij. Note that we are interested in two separate hypotheses, one relating 
to the volume effect of information frictions (H1) and the second one to the composition or 
pecking order effect (H2), ie that one type of financial asset holdings (k1) reacts differently to 
information frictions than other types of assets (k2): 
Volume effect hypothesis        0 : 1 =
k H β
Pecking order effect hypothesis   
2 1
2 :
k k H β β =
Our empirical analysis is cross-sectional, hence the explanatory power of the model comes 
purely from the cross-section, which is sensible given the focus on capital stocks and the fact 
that the independent variables on information frictions and institutions mostly change little 
over time. 
Note also that we estimate the model using   as the stocks in US dollars of asset type k. 
More precisely, we take the log value of the value in millions of US dollars and add one in 




 As there are several observations with a 
value of zero, it may raise the problem of censoring at zero. Although we use a TOBIT 
estimator and a two-step Heckman procedure to show that the results are largely robust to 
this specification, our preferred estimation technique is via seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR). This means that we estimate the four equations for each type of capital k 
simultaneously. The advantage of the SUR estimator is that it improves the efficiency of the 
estimates by allowing for cross-correlations of the residuals of the four equations. Moreover, 
it allows us to directly test our pecking order hypothesis H2 in the model.  
Note that we do not “normalise” the dependent variable by dividing by host country GDP for 
H1 on the volume effect or by dividing by total asset liabilities of host country j for H2 on the 
pecking order effect, as is frequently done in the literature. The reason is that each of these 
“normalisations” imposes restrictions on the parameters of the model that may not hold. 
Although such a normalisation is possible, our preferred specification is the one using the log 
of the levels of cross-border investment, given that it allows for more flexibility and enables 
us to test the volume and composition hypothesis in the same equation.
8
More generally, although it may seem appealing to exclude the fixed effects in order to 
explicitly allow for including vectors of source country-specific variables Xi  and of host 
                                                  
5   The inclusion of these country fixed effects has also been recommended by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) in empirical trade models to control for multilateral resistance. In the case of investment positions, the 
problem of omitted and unobserved variables at the source or host level might also be more serious, given the 
lack of an overall accepted theory of bilateral investment positions that could be used as a benchmark for the 
empirical exercise. 
6   See Cheng and Wall (2005) for the relevance of such a two-step approach for trade. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) use a very similar approach to ours for the case of bilateral portfolio positions. 
7   However, in our final sample the number of zeros is relatively small. Out of the final 1,116 observations, FDI 
values are all strictly positive, FPI portfolio has 187 zero observations, FPI debt 125, and loans 84, 
respectively. Our results do not change if we drop these observations. While not reported here, these 
regressions are available upon request. 
8   It should be pointed out that the country dummies capture the size effects of the source and host in an 
accurate way. 
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 country-specific variables Xj, this would imply excluding important unobserved components 
of relevant fixed effects and is likely to bias the estimators of interest  . We show below 




In the second part of the analysis, our aim is to understand the factors that explain the host 
country fixed effects. More precisely, we want to understand the role of markets and 
institutions in host countries as determinants of the composition of cross-border financial 
positions. As these factors are symmetric, ie investors in all source countries face the same 
conditions in a particular host country, we use the fixed effects obtained from the gravity 
model (1) to test for the role of host country institutions and market conditions Xj on the 





j X μ λ κ α + + =  (2) 
where   is an error term. Analogously to model (1), this specification allows us to formulate 
and test the two hypotheses with regard to the volume effect (H
k
j μ
3) and the pecking order 
effect (H4) of markets and institutions: 
Volume effect hypothesis        0 : 3 =
k H λ
Pecking order effect hypothesis   
2 1
4 :
k k H λ λ =
Our preferred estimator is again the SUR, and the same caveats and discussion apply to this 
second stage as to the estimation of model (1). 
3.2 Data 
As the focus of the paper is on the pecking order of cross-border investment, our data are on 
stocks of various types of foreign investment, rather than capital flows per se. We use three 
different data sources to construct a comprehensive database that covers all four categories 
of the financial account – or what is still often referred to as the capital account; two terms 
which we use interchangeably throughout the paper – ie for FDI, for portfolio investment – 
distinguishing also between equity and debt securities – and for loans. For FDI, we use the 
UNCTAD database on bilateral FDI stocks. A database that is often employed in studies on 
FDI is the one provided by the OECD. However, the UNCTAD database is more 
comprehensive as it includes both industrialised countries and developing countries. The 
UNCTAD data have annual entries in US dollars for around 90 reporting countries vis-à-vis 
most countries in the world from 1980 to 2003. Unfortunately, there are many missing 
entries, so that we do not have bilateral stocks for all country pairs. Moreover, country pairs 
are excluded from the analysis if there are no entries for the past 10 years.  
For portfolio investment, we use the Consolidated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) by the 
IMF. It provides bilateral assets of portfolio equity and portfolio debt securities for 68 
reporting countries.
9 We use the average figures for equity securities and for debt securities 
for 2001, 2002 and 2003. The CPIS also provides a breakdown between short-term and 
long-term debt securities. We conducted several tests but did not find systematic differences 
with this distinction, and thus ignore this dimension in the remainder of the paper.  
                                                  
9   In fact, the effective number of reporting countries ends up being 67, because Pakistan reports only missing 
data. 
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 For loans, we use the International Locational Banking Statistics (ILB) data provided by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The database comprises aggregate assets as well 
as aggregate liabilities of banks in 32 reporting countries vis-à-vis banking and non-banking 
institutions in more than 100 partner countries, capturing exclusively private claims. The 
reported assets and liabilities capture mostly loans and deposits, but may also include other 
transactions that fall under portfolio or direct investment (see BIS, 2003). To minimise this 
overlap, we use inter-bank claims, ie the data for assets and liabilities of banks in reporting 
countries vis-à-vis banks in partner countries. Although the number of reporting countries is 
smallest for this database, the fact that it includes data not only for assets but also for 
liabilities allows us to obtain a proxy also for asset holdings of non-reporting countries vis-à-
vis reporting countries. 
There are several caveats that are present for the various data sources. A first potential 
caveat is that the data stem from different sources, thus raising the issue of how comparable 
they are, though the definitions used are the same across sources. Moreover, one potentially 
important issue is that the data collection is generally based on the residence principle. This 
may imply that countries may report their asset holdings vis-à-vis their direct counterpart 
country but not vis-à-vis the country where the financial asset is ultimately invested. This of 
course would give enormous importance to financial centres as a lot of capital is channelled 
through these, but does not reflect the true bilateral holdings of financial assets. Hence we 
exclude financial centres from our analysis. 
Moreover, note that our empirical analysis is purely cross-sectional for two reasons: due to 
the fact that capital stocks obviously change little from one year to the next and also due to 
data availability. Due to the potential importance of valuation changes and other special 
factors affecting the size of capital stocks in individual years, our cross-section is the average 
size of capital stocks over the five-year period of 1999–2003.  
It is important to emphasise that we include only those country pairs for which all four types 
of asset holdings are available. This reduces the sample size to 77 countries. Appendix A 
shows the countries which are included. It reveals that the sample includes 22 richer, 
industrialised countries and 55 mainly emerging markets, but also some poorer developing 
countries. The country sample for the EMEs is roughly balanced across regions, with 12 in 
Africa/Middle East, 13 in Central and Eastern Europe, 13 in Asia and 17 in Latin America. 
The exclusion of many of the poorer developing countries is required by the fact that they do 
not have stock markets and/or bond markets. Thus the results on the pecking order are not 
driven by the absence of stock and bond markets in less developed countries. Further tests 
focusing only on industrialised countries and only for EMEs are conducted below and show 
the robustness of the findings to different country samples. 
3.3  Some stylised facts on the pecking order 
Figure 1 shows for a broad set of developed and emerging market economies that the 
poorest countries have the highest shares and the richest the lowest shares of FDI in total 
capital stocks. 
This stylised fact – as well as several others discussed in detail in the paper – makes the 
important point that the type of foreign financing of cross-border investment does not pursue 
a random pattern, but follows a certain “pecking order”.  
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 Figure 1 










FDI FPI equity FPI debt Loans
 
Note: GDP per capita is measured as the average PPP GDP per capita over the period 1999-2003. The x-axis 
shows the first to fifth quintile of countries, ranging from those with the lowest to those with the highest GDP per 
capita. 
Sources: IMF CPIS and IFS; UNCTAD; BIS; authors’ calculations. 
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the different types of financial liabilities, ie the 
table shows the total stocks of different types of capital held by foreigners in the host 
countries implied by the data described in the previous subsection. There are clear, 
systematic differences in the composition and volume of capital stocks across countries. 
First, developing countries receive on average a higher share  of FDI and loans than 
developed countries. For example, the average share of FDI in total foreign capital for 
developing countries is 44% while in the case of the developed countries FDI amounts only 
to 22%. In contrast, the share of portfolio equity and portfolio debt holdings is significantly 
higher for developed countries. Second, in terms of the volume of investments, developed 
countries receive significantly higher volumes of all types of capital. Developed countries 
receive on average – as a ratio of their GDP – around 2.5 times more FPI portfolio, 6.6 times 
more FPI debt, 2 times more loans, and 1.3 times more FDI than developing countries. 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients and the significance of investment shares with 
regard to selected indicators of income, market development and institutions. First, there is a 
large negative correlation of -0.38 between the share of FDI in stocks and per capita income 
of a country. Loans are also negatively correlated, though the correlation coefficient is not 
statistically significant. The same finding applies to domestic financial market development – 
as proxied by the degree of capital account liberalisation and by the ratio of credit to the 
private sector as percentage of GDP: the more developed financial markets are, the lower 
the shares of FDI and loans a country receives. Figure 2 illustrates in more detail the 
relationships between these different types of capital and per capita GDP. Moreover, 
countries with a higher risk of expropriation (indicated by a lower value in the figure) receive 
a significantly higher share of FDI and loans. 
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 Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std  dev  Min  Max 
EMEs / developing countries     
FDI  share    55  0.46 0.22 0.10 0.90 
Loans  share    55  0.30 0.18 0.00 0.70 
FPI debt share   55  0.14  0.11  0.00  0.40 
FPI portfolio share   55  0.10  0.11  0.00  0.50 
FDI/GDP    55  0.42 0.48 0.00 2.70 
Loans/GDP    55  0.34 0.91 0.00 6.80 
FPI  debt/GDP    55  0.13 0.14 0.00 0.50 
FPI  equity/GDP    55  0.11 0.22 0.00 1.40 
Developed countries        
FDI  share    22  0.22 0.10 0.05 0.38 
Loans  share    22  0.26 0.09 0.13 0.49 
FPI debt share   22  0.35  0.16  0.03  0.66 
FPI portfolio share   22  0.17  0.11  0.03  0.44 
FDI/GDP    22  0.56 0.59 0.03 2.44 
Loans/GDP    22  0.65 0.51 0.11 1.65 
FPI  debt/GDP    22  0.86 0.86 0.05 3.17 
FPI  equity/GDP    22  0.40 0.43 0.05 1.45 
Total        
FDI share   77  0.394  0.23  0.05  0.92 
Loans share   77  0.292  0.16  0.05  0.74 
FPI debt share   77  0.198  0.16  0.00  0.66 
FPI portfolio share   77  0.117  0.11  0.00  0.51 
FDI/GDP    77  0.462  0.51 0.03 2.66 
Loans/GDP    77  0.424  0.82 0.01 6.79 
FPI debt/GDP   77  0.339  0.57  0.00  3.12 
FPI equity/GDP   77  0.190  0.32  0.00  1.43 
Sources: IMF CPIS and IFS; UNCTAD; BIS; authors’ calculations. 
 
By contrast, both equity security and debt security holdings are strongly positively correlated 
with GDP per capita. In addition, countries that have a large share of portfolio equity and 
debt stocks also have more developed domestic financial markets and better institutions. 
Moreover, when considering the correlation of the shares of different types of assets with the 
average growth rate of GDP per capita over 1980–2003, the correlations show that there is a 
positive and significant correlation only for portfolio investment. 
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 Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
  FDI share  Loans share  FPI debt share  FPI equity share
FDI share   1.0000       
Loans share  –0.5140  1.0000    
FPI debt share   –0.4270 –0.3380  1.0000  
FPI equity share   –0.2810 –0.2960 –0.0570 1.0000 
GDP per capita (log)   –0.4050 –0.1700  0.4750  0.3190 
Private credit/GDP   –0.3570  –0.1060  0.2460 0.4710 
KA openness   –0.1370  –0.1520  0.2080 0.2020 
Property rights   0.3470  0.1470  –0.3420 –0.4490 
GDP per capita growth  0.0300  –0.1440  –0.0970  0.2870 
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        Sources: IMF CPIS and IFS; UNCTAD; BIS; authors’ calculations. 
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 Figure 3 
Stylised facts of pecking order: macro and exchange rate variables 
 GDP per capita GDP growth volatility








































FDI FPI equity FPI debt Loans
 
 
Note: GDP growth volatility is the standard deviation of annual real GDP growth rates over the period 1980-2003. 
Exchange rate volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly nominal exchange rate changes vis-à-
vis the US dollar over the period 1980-2003. The x-axis shows the first to fifth quintiles of countries. 
Sources: IMF CPIS and IFS; UNCTAD; BIS; authors’ calculations.  
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate these points in more detail by showing the distributions of the 
shares of individual types of capital by quintiles of the variable of interest, eg starting with the 
quintile of countries with the lowest GDP per capita on the left and leading up to those with 
the highest GDP per capita (top left panel of Figure 3). The top right panel of Figure 3 shows 
that countries that had the highest volatility in GDP growth rates – as measured as the 
standard deviation of annual real GDP growth rates over the period 1980-2003 – also 
experienced the highest degree of output volatility. 
Figure 4 shows corresponding charts for market development and various institutional 
indicators. For instance, countries with the least developed domestic financial markets – as 
proxied by credit to the private sector to GDP – have the highest share of the inward 
investment from abroad in the form of FDI and loans, which both fall as domestic financial 
development improves. Moreover, the bottom left panel of Figure 4 indicates that countries 
with higher corruption receive relatively more FDI and loans, and substantially less portfolio 
investment. Finally, also countries with a worse protection of property rights – as indicated by 
a rise in the indicator shown – have a larger share of FDI and loans and relatively fewer 
equity and debt securities. 
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 Figure 4 
Stylised facts of pecking order: market development and institutions 
 Dom market development: private credit/GDP Expropriation risk (inverse of)
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Note: A higher value of the expropriation risk indicator means a lower degree of risk, and a larger indicator for 
property rights indicates a worse protection of property rights. The x-axis shows the first to fifth quintiles of 
countries. 
Sources: IMF CPIS and IFS; UNCTAD; BIS; authors’ calculations. 
Overall, these stylised facts provide some first, descriptive evidence that there is indeed a 
pecking order in cross-border investment, as the various types of foreign capital stocks are 
strongly correlated with indicators of market development and institutions. A detailed analysis 
of the causality underlying these relationships is provided in the subsequent sections.  
4.  The pecking order and the role of information frictions 
We now turn to our econometric results. We start with the analysis of the role of information 
frictions (Section 4), before presenting the findings with regard to the role of markets and 
institutions (Section 5). 
4.1 Benchmark  results 
What is the role of information frictions in explaining the pecking order of cross-border 
investment positions? A first important issue is how to measure information frictions. We start 
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 by following the common practice in the literature both on trade in goods and on trade in 
financial assets and proxy information frictions through the log geographic distance between 
country pairs. We then proceed by using various alternative measures for information. 
Table 3 shows the results of our benchmark model (1), which includes in addition to distance 
a set of standard gravity variables, such as dummy variables on whether or not the two 
countries have a common language, a common legal origin and colonial links, and whether 
they have a trade agreement or a joint investment treaty to facilitate cross-border investment. 
The results are compelling both with regard to our hypothesis H2 about the pecking order of 
cross-border investment positions and with regard to the volume effects hypothesis H1. 
 
Table 3 
Information frictions: distance 
  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  Significance for pecking order 






      equity debt loans debt loans  loans 
Distance  –1.180*** –0.676*** –0.808*** –1.231***  0.00 0.00 0.52  0.07 0.00 0.00 
  (0.068) (0.057) (0.063) (0.068)        
Common   0.433*** 0.324**  0.111  0.247  0.54 0.11 0.32 0.22 0.67 0.46 
language  (0.160) (0.135) (0.149) (0.161)        
Common  0.713*** 0.568*** 0.395*** 0.438***  0.24 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.31 0.74 
legal origin  (0.112) (0.094) (0.104) (0.113)        
Colonial 0.924***  0.333* 0.198  0.321  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.56 0.96 0.62 
links  (0.216) (0.182) (0.200) (0.217)        
Trade –0.167  –0.336**  0.617***  0.230  0.38  0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 
agreement  (0.175) (0.147) (0.163) (0.176)        
Investment  0.260**  0.027 0.094 0.429***  0.06  0.24 0.20 0.58 0.00 0.01 
treaty  (0.113) (0.095) (0.105) (0.113)        
#  obs  1116  1116  1116  1116       
R-squared  0.828  0.907  0.881  0.847        
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  , with the right-hand columns showing 
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***,** and * show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
 
FDI and loans are substantially more sensitive to changes in distance than portfolio equity 
and portfolio debt investment. The differences in the effects are sizeable as the coefficients 
for FDI and loans are both around -1.2 as compared to point estimates of -0.67 and -0.80 for 
portfolio equity and debt. Also, these differences are highly statistically significant as shown 
in the right-hand columns of the table.
10
                                                  
10   Note that while the information variables have a larger effect on FDI than on portfolio investment (our pecking 
order hypothesis), the goodness-of-fit of the model for FDI is generally somewhat lower than that of portfolio 
investment equity and debt. This finding comes from the lower explanatory power of the fixed effects in the 
models for FDI, which can be seen by estimating the models including only the fixed effects. 
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 It is interesting to point out that the size of the estimated coefficients for distance is in line 
with the empirical literature on trade in assets, eg Portes and Rey (2005) report a coefficient 
of –0.89. In addition, the effect of distance on asset trade is greater than its effect on trade in 
goods, which according to Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) is mostly around -0.6. In the case 
of goods, Grossman (1998) shows that for sensible values of transportation costs, the 
distance elasticity should be around –0.03.
11 Thus, he concludes that information costs must 
be behind the empirical result that the effect is around 20 times larger. For trade in assets, it 
therefore seems that the case for distance reflecting information rather than trade costs is 
even more compelling. We explore this information hypothesis in more detail below. 
The point estimates for the variables on what is often referred to as “familiarity” effects are 
sensible as they have the correct sign and are mostly statistically significant. Like for the 
distance variable, FDI reacts much more strongly to these familiarity effects than is the case 
for portfolio equity and debt investment. For instance, when both countries speak the same 
language, FDI stocks in host countries are 54 percent higher and portfolio equity investment 
38 percent larger, whereas portfolio debt investment and loans are not statistically 
significantly different.
12
4.2   Robustness: alternative proxies for information frictions 
How robust are these findings to different proxies for information frictions? Clearly, it may 
seem odd to proxy information frictions for trade in financial assets through geographical 
distance as one would expect that geography should have little to do with financial 
transactions. However, the literature on capital flows has repeatedly found distance to be 
highly significant, see eg Portes and Rey (2005) for equity flows. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
employ alternative and ideally more direct proxies for information frictions. We use three 
proxies: the amount of telephone traffic between two countries, the trade in newspapers, and 
the bilateral stock of immigrants of the source country living in the host country and vice 
versa.  
The intuition for the use of these variables as proxies for the degree of information frictions is 
straightforward. The volume of telephone call traffic was proposed first by Portes and Rey 
(2005) and has been used in the most recent empirical literature.
13
 Telephone traffic is a 
proxy of the amount of information that flows between both countries, and it is assumed that 
a larger volume of information flows – controlling additionally for the size of both economies – 
implies less informational frictions. A similar rationale has been put forward to use trade in 
newspapers and periodicals by Nicita and Olarreaga (2000) to study information spillovers in 
goods markets. They report a high correlation of trade in newspapers with telephone traffic (a 
simple correlation of 0.77), but prefer their measure due to greater data availability. Finally, 
Gould (1994) analyses the impact of the stock of immigrants in the United States on trade 
between the Uunited States and the immigrants’ country of origin. The intuition is that 
immigrants have better information on the markets and institutions in their home country, 
which would lower transaction costs. 
Table 4 shows the results when adding telephone traffic to the benchmark model. One 
important result is that when adding telephone traffic, it is not only highly significant, but 
distance becomes insignificant for FDI and portfolio equity and debt investment. Distance 
                                                  
11   For a recent survey on the importance of trade costs, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). 
12   Note that the coefficients for the dummy variables are not strictly elasticities. The calculation of the elasticity, 
for instance for the former variable, can be done by using: exp(0.43) – 1 = 0.537. 
13   See Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) for the case of equity flows; Loungani, Mody and Razin (2002), as well as di 
Giovanni (2005) for FDI; and Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003) for FDI and equity. 
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retains its significance for loans, albeit with a much smaller coefficient of –0.34 as compared 
to –1.23 in the benchmark model of Table 3. It is important to point out that this result is not 
driven by multicollinearity problems between telephone traffic and distance, given that the 
simple correlation between both variables in our sample is just –0.13. In addition, although 
the sample is reduced due to the availability restrictions on telephone traffic, if we re-estimate 
the regression from Table 3 for this subsample, the distance coefficients are negative, 
significant, and not different from the estimates for the whole sample. Therefore, distance 
seems to be a proxy for overall information frictions in asset trade. When comparing the 
pecking order effect of information frictions, telephone traffic is again significantly larger for 
FDI and also loans than for equity and debt. 
 
Table 4 
Information frictions: distance versus telephone traffic 
  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  Significance for pecking order 






      equity debt loans debt loans  loans 
Distance  –0.072 –0.091 –0.071 –0.341** 0.90  1.00  0.10  0.90 0.12 0.09 
  (0.130) (0.112) (0.131) (0.134)        
Telephone    0.721*** 0.447**  0.399*** 0.595***  0.00 0.00 0.23 0.63 0.15 0.06 
traffic  (0.083) (0.072) (0.084) (0.086)        
Common    –0.016  0.130  0.126  –0.144  0.49 0.56 0.57 0.98 0.22 0.22 
language  (0.181) (0.157) (0.184) (0.187)        
Common  0.505*** 0.448*** 0.327**  0.402*** 0.70 0.30 0.52 0.42 0.77 0.63 
legal origin  (0.126) (0.109) (0.128) (0.130)        
Colonial 0.353 –0.055 –0.177 –0.357  0.13  0.10 0.01 0.66 0.30 0.53 
links  (0.216) (0.182) (0.200) (0.217)        
Trade –0.106  –0.299*  0.845***  0.304 0.37  0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 
agreement  (0.184) (0.159) (0.186) (0.190)        
Investment  0.078  0.314**  0.313*  0.591*** 0.21 0.29 0.01 1.00 0.17 0.16 
treaty  (0.162) (0.140) (0.164) (0.167)        
#  obs  595 595 595 595       
R-squared  0.873  0.928  0.884  0.850        
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  , with the right-hand columns showing 
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Information frictions: alternative information proxies 
    FDI     FPI  equity     FPI  debt     Loans   
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 












Trade in  0.064***       0.030***       0.035***       0.069***     
newspapers (0.012)
E,D       (0.010)
F,L       (0.011)
F,L     (0.012)
E,D   
Stock of    0.180***       0.105***       0.107**       0.127**   
foreigners   (0.050)     (0.037)     (0.041)     (0.053)   






Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 









ij X y ε β α α + + + = + 1 log
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k k H β β =
F, different that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different that of debt securities for 
D and different that of loans for 
L.  ***,** and * show statistical significance of 
the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
component    (0.087)
E,D       (0.065)
F       (0.073)
F,L       (0.096)
D
Common    0.364**    0.244 0.066 0.292**    0.146 0.128 0.073  –0.069 0.097 0.173  –0.089 
language  (0.159) (0.207) (0.229) (0.135) (0.153) (0.172) (0.148) (0.172) (0.191) (0.159) (0.220) 
Common legal   0.665***   0.767***   0.759***   0.545***   0.451***   0.418***   0.368***   0.654***   0.712***   0.386***   1.012***  0.967*** 
origin (0.111)
D,L   (0.166)
E   (0.186)
E  (0.094) (0.123)
F,L   (0.139)
F,D,L  (0.104)
F  (0.138)
L   (0.155)
E  (0.112)
F   (0.176)
E,D   (0.204)
E
Colonial    0.778***    –0.274 –0.380  0.265 –0.279 –0.358  0.118 –0.071 –0.324  0.166 –0.577 
links (0.215)
E,D,L  (0.357) (0.370) (0.182)
F (0.264) (0.278) (0.201)
F  (0.296) (0.309) (0.216)
F   (0.378)  (0.407) 
Trade   –0.162  0.241  0.171   (0.333)**   –0.037  0.022  0.620***   0.917***   0.693***   0.235  0.438**   0.446** 
agreement (0.173)
D,L   (0.197)
D   (0.205)
D (0.147)
D,L   (0.146)




F,E   (0.174)
F,E,D  (0.209)
E,D   (0.226)
E
Investment   0.218*   –0.026  –0.435  0.007  0.334**   0.318  0.071  0.617***   0.698***   0.385***   0.483**   0.766** 
treaty (0.112)
E   (0.225)
D,L   (0.279)
E,D,L  (0.095)




F   (0.112)
E,D   (0.239)
F   (0.307)
F
#  observations    1116 474  332 1116 474  332 1116 474  332 1116 474 
R-squared    0.832 0.864 0.876 0.908 0.928 0.938 0.882 0.904 0.913 0.851 0.842 
 Table 5 gives the estimates for the other two alternative information proxies as well as for a 
model that instead includes the first principal component of the three proxies. We include the 
principal component of all three alternative proxies because it may help alleviate 
measurement errors related to each individual variable.
14 The results confirm that FDI and 
loans are more sensitive to information frictions. However, distance remains significant in 
most of these specifications, and with the same order as before as information generally has 
the largest effects on FDI and loans and the smallest impact on portfolio equity and debt. 
4.3  Robustness: alternative model specifications and controls 
Finally, we conduct a battery of sensitivity tests by using alternative econometric specification 
and by adding various controls to the empirical specification of the model. A first test is to ask 
whether the results are robust to taking ratios, of GDP or of total capital stocks, as dependent 
variables, which is commonly done in the literature, despite the controversial assumptions 
underlying such a specification, as discussed in Section 3.1. Table 6 shows the estimates for 
the benchmark model where the dependent variable is measured as a percentage of source 
and host country GDP and as a percentage of total capital flows from source country i to host 
country j. The results indicate that although the coefficients are very different, our overall 
results with regard to the pecking order still hold: FDI and loans are in both specifications 
significantly and substantially larger than portfolio equity and portfolio debt investment. 
As the next step, we investigate the robustness of the results to using alternative 
econometric estimators. Table 7 provides the results for a TOBIT estimator and for an OLS 
estimator without source and host country fixed effects. The estimates of the TOBIT model 
are in line with those obtained from our OLS benchmark. Recall that the TOBIT model is a 
non-linear estimator that uses a mixture of a continuous distribution over the non-censored 
observations and a discrete distribution for the censored ones. The point estimates shown in 
the table are the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. Hence 
the size of the marginal effects is not so meaningful. 
There are some interesting differences between the model with and that without fixed effects. 
The model without fixed effects is estimated by including nominal GDP (in US dollars) and 
the population of both the source country and the host country instead of the fixed effects. 
There are two important points to note from the results. First, almost all point estimates for 
the proxies of information frictions are substantially different from those of the benchmark 
fixed effects model. This lends support to the point we made above that it is important to 
estimate the model by including fixed effects as otherwise the point estimates are biased due 
to omitted variables. Nevertheless, even without the fixed effects our pecking order 
hypothesis is confirmed. Second, note that the hypothesis that the point estimates of the 
GDP variables are equal to one is rejected in almost all equations. This is a noteworthy fact 
because it stresses that a “normalisation” of the model, ie including the dependent variables 




                                                  
14   About 81 percent of the total variation in the three alternative proxies is explained by their first principal 
component. The factor loadings are high for all three variables, so that they seem to be well represented by 
the first factor. 
15   We also tested for the importance of censoring, due to a few of the observations in our sample being zero, by 
using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. While the results are not shown for brevity reasons, the point 
estimates are very similar, underscoring that there is no significant bias stemming from a censoring problem in 
our data. 
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 Table 6 
Information frictions: ratios as % of GDP and total capital stocks 
  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans 
  Ratio as % of GDP  Ratio as % of total capital stocks 
Distance   –0.453***   –0.105***   –0.243***   –0.527***   –0.282***   0.086  0.051  –0.339*** 
 (0.054)
E,D (0.016)
F,D,L   (0.030)
F,E,L (0.056)
E,D   (0.065)
E,D   (0.062)
F,L   (0.062)
F,L   (0.050)
E,D
Common   0.425***  0.058  0.010  –0.255*   0.097  0.012  –0.238*   –0.286** 
language (0.127)
E,D,L (0.037)
F,L   (0.070)
F,L   (0.131)
F,E,D (0.150)
L   (0.142)  (0.143)  (0.115)
F
Common   –0.027  0.060**   0.170***   0.151  0.246**   0.212**   0.021  0.109 
legal origin   (0.089)
D (0.026)
D   (0.048)
F,E    (0.092) (0.104) (0.098) (0.099) (0.080) 
Colonial   0.355**  0.200***   0.271***   0.516***   0.457**   –0.100  0.009  –0.102 
links   (0.170)  (0.050)
L   (0.093)  (0.176)
E   (0.204)
E,L   (0.193)
F   (0.194)  (0.157)
F
Trade   0.127  –0.007  0.470***   –0.107  –0.219  –0.335**   0.482***   –0.117 
agreement   (0.136)
D (0.040)
D   (0.075)
F,E,L (0.141)
D   (0.159)
D   (0.151)
D   (0.151)
F,E,L (0.122)
D
Investment   –0.308***   –0.066**   –0.080  –0.271***   –0.058  –0.002  –0.081  0.293*** 
treaty   (0.092)
E,D (0.027)
F,L   (0.050)
F,L   (0.095)
E,D   (0.121)
L   (0.115)
L   (0.115)
L   (0.093)
F,E,D
# obs   1027  1027  1027  1027  842  842  842  842 
R-squared    0.323 0.499 0.549 0.369 0.985 0.932 0.937 0.756 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the 
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F, different from that of 
equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.   
***,** and * show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
 
Next, we test for the presence of asymmetries in the effects of information fictions across 
samples. In particular, it is possible that some types of countries are much more sensitive to 
information than others, for instance those where information is already very scarce. Table 8 
shows the results when estimating the benchmark model (1) separately for when only 
industrialised countries and when only EMEs are the host countries. Overall, the results 
confirm that FDI and loans are most sensitive to information frictions. Moreover, some 
interesting differences across country groups emerge. In particular, capital stocks are much 
more sensitive to information and familiarity effects when the host country is an emerging 
market economy. The elasticity for FDI, for instance, is –1.54 for EMEs but only –0.89 for 
industrialised countries. Investment in EMEs also appears to be more sensitive to the 
common language and the colonial links. Taken together, these findings confirm our 
hypothesis on the pecking order, but also underline the presence of important asymmetries 
in the effect of information frictions. 
One set of explanations that we have not analysed so far is risk sharing or risk diversification 
as a driver of cross-border investment. As discussed in Section 2, there is a large literature 
on the determinants of risk sharing and home bias. Thus the motivation for the type and 
direction of cross-border capital flows may not only be information frictions and institutions 
but also the attempt to diversify idiosyncratic, home country risk. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005) argue that a source 
country that receives a high share of its imports from a particular host country will want to 
acquire more capital in this specific host country in order to insure itself against terms of 
trade shocks to this country. Extending this argument to risk diversification, it may be optimal 
for investors to invest relatively more in those countries with the lowest or even a negative 
degree of output correlation with its own. 
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 Table 7 
Information frictions: alternative estimators 
  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans 
  Without fixed effects  TOBIT estimator 
GDP:  1.985***   2.167***   1.821***   1.100***      




F,E,D     
GDP:  0.854***   1.647***   1.386***   1.137***      




F,E,D     
Population:   –1.108***   –1.543***   –1.100***   –0.106      
source cty  (0.071)
E,L   (0.067)
F,D,L  (0.075)
E,L   (0.080)
F,E,D     
Population:  –0.093*   –0.650***   –0.619***   –0.326***      
host cty  (0.051)
E,D,L  (0.048)
F,L   (0.054)
F,L   (0.058)
F,E,D     
Distance   –0.462***   –0.181***   –0.460***   –0.717***   –1.072***   –0.988***   –0.954***   –1.445*** 
 (0.064)
E,L   (0.061)
F,D,L  (0.067)
E,L  (0.073)
F,E,D (0.051) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) 





F,E    (0.134) (0.125) (0.127) (0.114) 
Common   0.940***   0.603***   0.574***   0.805***   0.704***   0.547***   0.380***   0.271*** 
legal origin   (0.146)
E,D   (0.138)
F   (0.154)
F    (0.165) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.080) 
Colonial   1.181***   0.729***   0.889***   1.370***   1.096***   0.917***   0.456**   0.898*** 
links   (0.282)  (0.267)
D  (0.297)
E    (0.319) (0.167) (0.168) (0.176) (0.146) 
Trade   0.486***   0.723***   1.576***   0.837***   0.592***   0.453***   0.929***   0.011 
agreement   (0.181)
E   (0.172)
F,D   (0.191)
E,L   (0.205)
D    (0.146) (0.146) (0.153) (0.152) 
Investment   0.310**   –0.153  0.048  0.504***   –0.129  –0.039  0.002  0.579*** 
treaty   (0.125)
E   (0.119)
F,L  (0.132)
L  (0.142)
E,D    (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.074) 
#  obs    1030 1030 1030 1030 1116 1116 1116 1116 
(Pseudo)  
R-squared   0.651 0.757 0.679 0.589 0.357 0.486 0.418 0.369 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1): log . The superscripted letters indicate for the 









ij X y ε β α α + + + = + 1
2 1
2 :
k k H β β =
F, different from that of 
equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.  Note that no such 
tests are possible for the TOBIT specification because it is not estimated as a system of equations. 
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Information frictions: developed countries versus emerging market economies 
  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans 
  Developed countries  Emerging market economies 
Distance   –0.893***   –0.693***   –0.513***   –1.047***   –1.543***   –0.589***   –1.019***   –1.595*** 
 (0.097)
E,D   (0.076)
F,D,L  (0.076)
F,E,L  (0.096)
E,D   (0.106)




Common   0.097  0.153  0.175  –0.091  0.942***   0.444*   0.336  0.975*** 
language (0.203) (0.158) (0.159) (0.200) (0.260)
E,D   (0.232)
F,L   (0.238)
F,L   (0.244)
E,D
Common   0.975***   0.655***   0.393***   0.853***   0.550***   0.543***   0.411**   –0.104 
legal origin   (0.144)
E,D   (0.112)
F,D   (0.113)
F,D,L  (0.142)
D   (0.177)
L  (0.158)
L  (0.162)
L   (0.167)
F,E,D
Colonial   0.681**   0.326  0.397*   –0.218  0.998***   0.083  0.387  0.851*** 
links   (0.294)
L   (0.229)  (0.231)
L   (0.291)
F,D   (0.330)
E  (0.294)
F,L   (0.302)  (0.310)
E
Trade   0.206  –0.183  1.099***   0.441**   0.212  1.226*   0.808  0.663 
agreement   (0.218)
D   (0.170)
D,L   (0.171)
F,E,L  (0.216)
E,D    (0.748) (0.667) (0.684) (0.702) 
Investment   0.150  0.079  0.374**   0.879***   0.238*   0.016  –0.065  –0.006 
treaty   (0.224)
L   (0.175)L   (0.176)
L   (0.222)
F,E,D  (0.140)
D   (0.125)  (0.128)
F   (0.132) 
# obs   573 573 573 573 543 543 543 543 
R-squared   0.872 0.928 0.917 0.848 0.780 0.857 0.842 0.854 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the 









ij X y ε β α α + + + = + 1 log
2 1
2 :
k k H β β =
F, different from that of 
equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.   
***,** and * show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                
We therefore add to our benchmark model imports of source country i from host country j 
(see left panel of Table 9) to investigate whether the findings for information frictions change 
when controlling for proxies of risk sharing. The table shows that trade is indeed positively 
correlated with all four types of capital investment. As an alternative control, we include 
bilateral real exchange rate volatility, measured over the period 1990-2003, as a regressor 
(middle panel of Table 9) in order to test whether uncertainty and risk affects cross-border 
investment. It is, however, found to be significant only for investment in debt securities, and 
to a lesser degree for FDI.
16 We also attempt to control for the effect of global factors on 
cross-border investment. The intuition is that two countries that exhibit a very different 
responsiveness to global shocks should also have less bilateral investment. We use daily US 
short-term interest rate changes as our proxy for global shocks, and take the difference in the 
reaction of short-term interest rates between the source country and host country as our 
measure of the different response to global shocks.
17 The right panel of Table 9 shows that 
the difference in the response to such global shocks indeed reduces bilateral portfolio 
investment and loans, though not FDI. 
17   Short-term interest rates for most countries are three-month money market rates, if available. The estimation 
is based on daily interest rate changes over the period 1990–2004. 
16   We also tested for the interaction effect of exchange rate volatility and information, but did not find any 






























































Information frictions: robustness tests with trade, exchange rate volatility and global interest rate shocks as controls 
  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans  FDI  FPI equity  FPI debt  Loans 
  With control for trade  With control for exchange rate volatility  With control for global interest rate shock 
Distance  –0.692***   –0.362***   –0.689***   –0.773***   –1.232***   –0.655***   –0.694***   –1.246***   –0.995***   –0.605***   –0.563***   –1.063*** 
 (0.088)
E   (0.074)
F,D,L   (0.083)
E   (0.088)
E  (0.073)
E,D   (0.062)
F,L   (0.068)
F,L   (0.074)
E,D   (0.079)
E,D   (0.063)
F,L   (0.075)
F,L   (0.083)
E,D
Trade:  0.384***    0.247***    0.119***    0.382***          
imports (0.047)
E,D   (0.040)
F,D,L   (0.044)
F,E,L (0.047)
E,D         
Exchange  rate       10.875*    –4.388  –23.816***    3.136      
volatility       (5.968)
D   (5.028)
D  (5.502)
F,E,L (6.004)
D     
Global  interest           0.191  –0.389***    –0.345**    –0.322** 
rate  shock           (0.150)
E,D,L (0.119)
F   (0.142)
F   (0.158)
F
Common  0.384**   0.334**   0.037  0.176  0.454***   0.316**   0.066  0.253  0.368**   0.257*   0.050  0.025 
language (0.161)
D   (0.136)
D   (0.152)
F,E   (0.162)  (0.160)  (0.135)
D   (0.148)
E   (0.161)  (0.175)
D,L   (0.139)  (0.166)
F   (0.184)
F
Common  0.603***   0.500***   0.390***   0.330***   0.703***   0.572***   0.417***   0.435***   0.628***   0.538***   0.443***   0.631*** 
legal origin  (0.113)
L   (0.095)  (0.106)  (0.113)
F  (0.112)
D,L   (0.094)  (0.103)
F (0.113)
F   (0.124)
D  (0.098) (0.118)
F   (0.131) 
Colonial  0.811***  0.208 0.135 0.209 0.922***  0.334*  0.200 0.321 0.905***  0.380*  0.221 0.304 
links (0.216)
E,D,L   (0.183)
F   (0.203)
F   (0.218)
F   (0.215)
E   (0.181)
F   (0.199)  (0.217)  (0.252)
E,D,L (0.199)
F   (0.239)
F   (0.265)
F
Trade   –0.075  –0.283*   0.632***   0.267  –0.068  –0.376**   0.399**   0.258  0.080  –0.170  0.877***   0.463** 
agreement   (0.173)
D   (0.147)
D,L  (0.163)
F,E,L (0.175)
E,D   (0.183)
D,L   (0.154)
D,L   (0.169)
F,E  (0.184)
F,E   (0.184)
D,L   (0.145)
D,L   (0.174)
F,E   (0.193)
F,E
Investment   0.042  –0.038  –0.010  0.297**   0.222*   0.042  0.177*   0.419***   0.458***   0.335***   0.330**   0.532*** 
treaty   (0.118)
L   (0.100)D   (0.111)
E,L   (0.119)
F,E,D (0.115)
L   (0.096)
L   (0.106)
L   (0.115)
F,E,D  (0.144) (0.114) (0.137) (0.152) 
#  observations  1027 1027 1027 1027  782  782  782  782  1027 1027 1027  772 
R-squared    0.841 0.911 0.883 0.851 0.845 0.920 0.895 0.849 0.830 0.912 0.876 0.823 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 









ij X y ε β α α + + + = + 1 log
2 1
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k k H β β =
F, different from that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
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Information frictions: robustness tests with institutional controls 
   FDI     FPI equity     FPI debt     Loans   
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Information:              
Distance  –1.180***   –0.939***   –1.162***   –0.676***   –0.557***   –0.652***   –0.808***   –0.628***   –0.802***   –1.231***   –0.933***   –1.228*** 
 (0.068)
E,D   (0.079)
E,D   (0.073)
E   (0.057)
F,L   (0.066)
F,D,L (0.061)
F,L   (0.063)
F,L   (0.078)
F,E,L (0.068)  (0.068)
E,D   (0.083)
E,D   (0.074)
E
Common  0.433***   0.302*   0.358**   0.324**   0.265*   0.287**   0.111  0.096  –0.024  0.247  –0.131  0.093 
language  (0.160) (0.160) (0.173) (0.135) (0.134) (0.144) (0.149) (0.158) (0.161) (0.161) (0.168) (0.175) 
Common  0.713***   0.683***   0.808***   0.568***   0.565***   0.598***   0.395***   0.314***   0.347***   0.438***   0.695***   0.587*** 
legal origin  (0.112)
D,L   (0.112)
E   (0.130)
E   (0.094)  (0.094)
F,L   (0.108)
F,D,L (0.104)
F   (0.111)
L   (0.120)
E   (0.113)
F   (0.118)
E,D   (0.131)
E
Colonial  0.924***   0.838***   1.289***   0.333*   0.428**   0.440**   0.198  0.686***   0.309  0.321  0.475**   0.472* 
links (0.216)
E,D,L    (0.226) (0.255) (0.182)
F    (0.190) (0.212) (0.200)
F   (0.224)  (0.237)  (0.217)F   (0.238)  (0.257) 
Trade   –0.167  0.209  –0.032 D   –0.336**   0.038  –0.233  0.617***   1.130***   0.736***   0.230  1.036***   0.504*** 
agreement   (0.175)
D,L   (0.186)
D   (0.187)  (0.147)
D,L   (0.157)
D,L   (0.156)
D,L   (0.163)
F,E,L (0.185)
F,E,L (0.174)
F,E   (0.176)
F,E,D (0.197)
E,D   (0.189)
E
Investment   0.260**   0.237  0.224*   0.027  0.051  0.003  0.094  0.300**   0.065  0.429***   0.471***   0.467*** 
treaty   (0.113)
E   (0.144)
D,L   (0.123)
E,D,L (0.095)
F,L   (0.121)  (0.102)
F   (0.105)
L   (0.143)
F   (0.114)
F   (0.113)
E,D   (0.152)
F   (0.124)
F
Institutions:              
Cap account  6.821***       2.525***       4.039***       4.786***     
openness (0.466)
E,D       (0.392)
F,L       (0.433)
F       (1.246)
E   
Expropriation    0.938***       1.796***       2.384***       –0.657*   
risk   (0.305)
E,D,L       (0.286)
F,L       (0.302)
F,L       (0.359)
F,E,D  
Property     0.834***       1.052***       2.121***       0.778*** 
rights     (0.271)
D       (0.228)
L       (0.269)
F,L       (0.196)
E,D
#  observations    1116 1027  704  1116 1027  704  1116 1027  704  1116 1027  704 
R-squared    0.828 0.841 0.841 0.907 0.911 0.917 0.881 0.883 0.881 0.847  0.837  0.851 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (1):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 









ij X y ε β α α + + + = + 1 log
2 1
2 :
k k H β β =
F, different from that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.   
***,** and * show statistical significance of the coefficients at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
 It is important to stress that trade, exchange rate volatility and possibly are likely to be to 
some extent endogenous to cross-border investment and one would need to find suitable 
instruments if one wanted to investigate the link between risk sharing and capital flows. 
However, the important point to note for the objective of this paper is that information frictions 
as proxied by distance (or other information proxies when substituted for distance) retain 
their significance and the pecking order of FDI and loans being the most sensitive to 
information frictions and portfolio investment the least sensitive is confirmed.
18
Finally, in order to ensure that the coefficients of the information variables are not capturing, 
for instance, the differential between host and source country institutional characteristics, we 
estimate the benchmark model (1) by including interaction variables between host and 
source country institutional characteristics Xij, measured as the sum of the institutional 
variables of both. Table 10 shows the results of this extension, using three different 
institutional variables (KA openness, expropriation risk, and property rights). Most 
importantly, the table shows that the pecking order hypothesis regarding our information 
proxies is confirmed, ie FDI continues to be significantly more sensitive to information than 
portfolio investment. Moreover, the explanatory power stemming from institutional factors – 
gauged from estimating the model separately with only information proxies and only 
institutional variables – is similar in magnitude. However, the main difficulty relates to 
institutions, as their coefficients cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way in this context. In 
particular: better institutions in the host country should raise cross-border investment from 
country i in country j. The opposite holds true for the source country: better institutions in 
country  i  should  lower  cross-border investment outflows from country i. Hence an 
insignificant coefficient for institutional interactions Xij in the framework of Table 10 cannot be 
interpreted in a meaningful way as institutions may still be highly important, only that the 
positive effect of institutions in host country j may be offset by the negative effect of 
institutions in source country i. Thus, as explained in Section 3.1, we attempt to analyse the 
role of institutions in the second step of model (2), to which we turn in the next section.  
Overall, the first key result that we take from this section is that there is a clear pecking order 
with regard to information frictions. FDI and loans are substantially more sensitive to 
information frictions than portfolio investment. The differences are large and statistically 
significant. These findings are also robust to several alternative proxies for information 
frictions, in particular when using telephone traffic. Moreover, various robustness tests 
confirm the specification of the model and underline the robustness of the results on the 
pecking order hypothesis to alternative specifications and different econometric estimators.
19
Thus, the results indicate that FDI and loans are more sensitive to information frictions – or 
more information-intensive – than portfolio investment, equity and debt. A possible 
explanation for this fact is that FDI and loans in general require frequent interaction and a 
deeper knowledge of the markets where they operate. Also, especially for the case of FDI, 
once an asset has been acquired, direct ownership makes the asset less liquid given the 
potential lemon problem in case of a re-sale, as Goldstein and Razin (2006) point out. Thus, 
                                                  
18   As a final check, we find that the results are robust to using alternative country samples, i.e. our pecking order 
hypothesis that FDI and loans are most sensitive to information frictions is confirmed for both emerging market 
countries as well as industrialised countries. Results are available upon request. 
19   We have also conducted further robustness checks, especially splitting the sample between industrialised and 
emerging economies, and the results hold for both groupings of countries. While we do not present the results 
here due to space considerations, they can be found in an earlier working paper version (Daude and 
Fratzscher, 2006). 
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FDI becomes partially irreversible or costlier to liquidate, and therefore more sensitive to 
information in the first place.
20
5.   The pecking order and the role of institutions and financial market 
development 
We now turn to the role of financial markets and institutions. The central focus is on the 
question of whether we can identify a pecking order of cross-border capital positions with 
regard to the degree of development and openness of markets and the quality of institutions 
in the host country. For this purpose, we extract the host country fixed effects from model 
(1)  and then estimate model  (2), ie we attempt to explain the host country fixed effects 
through market conditions and institutions. Note that given the specification of model 
(1) where the dependent variable is measured in value terms, we need to control for size 
effects in model (2). We do so by including host country GDP in each of the specifications 
below, though we omit to show the point estimates for this variable for brevity reasons.
21 All 
variables used are described in more detail in Appendix B. 
We start with the role of market development and openness. We use three different proxies. 
First, we employ a capital account openness dummy. This dummy takes the value of one if 
the country had fully liberalised its capital account by the mid-1990s, and is zero otherwise. 
Data for this variable come from the IMF’s Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The finding is remarkably strong as portfolio equity and 
portfolio debt investment react strongly to capital account openness, whereas the coefficients 
for FDI and loans are positive but only marginally statistically significant (see Table 11). The 
magnitude of the effects is large: a country that is open receives about 80% more equity 
capital and 80% more debt investment compared to an economy with a closed capital 
account.
22
Second, we investigate the effect of the development of the domestic financial sector on the 
pecking order. We include credit to the private sector as a proxy for financial development. 
Table 11 shows that the elasticities are by the far the largest for equity investment, which is 
about twice as large as that for debt securities and FDI. These differences are statistically 
significant, while in the case of FDI investment appears to not react to changes in the degree 
of financial market development in the host country.  
Third, we analyse the role of the development of the local stock market, and proxy this 
through stock market capitalisation. The bottom panel of Table 11 indicates again that equity 
investment is most strongly related to changes in market capitalisation but nevertheless also 




20   Although we cannot distinguish between greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions in our data, this 
informational friction is linked to ownership control and thus applies to both types of FDI. 
21  Observe that all regressions exhibit a very high R-squared. This reflects the fact that the country effects are 
highly correlated with country size measured by GDP of 0.87, 0.90, 0.81 and 0.83 between the estimated host 
country fixed effects and the host’s GDP for FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt and loans, respectively. 
22   Recall that only countries with existing stock and bond markets are included in the analysis, so that the results 






























































Role of market development and transparency 
  FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans    FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans 

























#  observations  69 69 69 69  #  observations  65 65 65 65 




























#  observations  64 64 64 64  #  observations  37 37 37 37 




























#  observations  46 46 46 46  #  observations  63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.6589 0.8880 0.6045 0.7349  R-squared 0.7410 0.8680 0.7992 0.7684 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (2):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 




j X μ λ κ α + + =
2 1
4 :
k k H λ λ =
F, different from that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.   







Role of investor protection and corruption 
  FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans    FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans 



























#  observations  66 66 66 66  #  observations  61 61 61 61 



























#  observations  66 66 66 66  #  observations  56 56 56 56 




























#  observations  65 65 65 65  #  observations  57 57 57 57 
R-squared  0.7335 0.8258 0.7127 0.7091  R-squared 0.7210 0.8477 0.7630 0.7051 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (2):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 




j X μ λ κ α + + =
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4 :
k k H λ λ =
F, different from that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
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As a next step, we analyse the role of institutions for the pecking order of cross-border 
capital positions. As discussed in detail in Section 2, there have been a number of studies 
arguing that different types of capital should react differently to various institutional features. 
For instance, Albuquerque’s (2003) model implies that FDI is harder to expropriate as the 
information required for and obtained by FDI is inalienable. Various other studies have 
focused on individual types of capital flows and how they are linked to other institutional 
elements such as corruption, transparency and political risk (eg Wei, 2000a; Papaioannou, 
2005; Gelos and Wei, 2005). 
We test the effect of various institutional features. While it is hard to determine which 
institutional factors to focus on, we are guided in our choice of institutional variables by the 
mostly theoretical literature discussed in Section 2. The sources for these variables are 
manifold, stemming partly from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) and Djankov 
et al (2002) and partly from the databases of the World Bank Doing Business and of the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Tables 11 and 12 show the findings for three sets of institutional variables. First, we look at 
the role of transparency. For this, we employ both a measure of the quality of information 
disclosure and of the quality of the accounting standards required by law in the host country 
– with higher values indicating a better quality. For both measures, portfolio equity 
investment reacts the strongest to changes in these transparency measures, while in the 
case of accounting standards the coefficient for debt securities and loans is also significant at 
a 10% level. FDI and loans are the least responsive. In fact, the elasticity of equity 
investment is about three times larger than that for FDI and for loans. 
Second, we analyse the role of investor protection (last regression in Table 11 and Table 12). 
In particular, a lower risk of expropriation – indicated by a higher value of the variable in the 
table – has a highly significant impact mainly on portfolio investment. By contrast, the 
elasticity of loans is only about one half of that of portfolio investment, while FDI does not 
react at all to differences in expropriation risk. This finding thus provides strong support for 
the hypothesis formulated by Albuquerque (2003) and is line with the stylised facts presented 
above in Section 3.  
Moreover, Table 11 shows that an improvement in the quality of property rights – indicated 
by a decline in the variable in the table – has a significant and the largest impact on portfolio 
equity and debt investment, a lower effect on loans, but no effect on FDI. An almost identical 
picture emerges for repudiation costs and for the quality of enforcement of laws and 
regulations – which is measured in terms of the number of the days it takes to enforce a 
particular ruling: the higher the number, the worse the system of enforcement. Overall, all 
three measures therefore indicate that investor protection has the largest effect on portfolio 
investment but does not appear to have any significant effect on FDI stocks. 
Third, we analyse the importance of corruption  for the pecking order. We use three 
alternative proxies for corruption: the first from Transparency International, the second from 
the World Development Report of the World Bank, and the third from a survey of German 
manufacturing firms. All three indicators have been used previously by Wei (2000b). In all 
cases, a higher value indicates a higher degree of corruption. Overall, the same finding 
emerges for all three of the proxies: corruption has the strongest negative effect on portfolio 
investment and some, though smaller, effect on loans. Corruption does not appear to have 
any significant effect on FDI. This finding is in line with Daude and Stein (2004), who do not 































































Role of market development and transparency – 3SLS estimator 
  FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans    FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans 





























#  observations  65 65 65 65  #  observations  65 65 65 65 




























#  observations  64 64 64 64  #  observations  37 37 37 37 



























#  observations  45 45 45 45  #  observations  33 33 33 33 
R-squared  0.6374 0.8793 0.6017 0.6970  R–squared  0.7345 0.6593 0.6848 0.6645 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (2):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 




j X μ λ κ α + + =
2 1
4 :
k k H λ λ =
F, different from that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.  
The estimator is a three-stage least-squares (3SLS) one, where the instruments are legal origin dummies and religion dummies for market development and settler mortality (in 
logs) for institutions. 



















Role of investor protection and corruption – 3SLS estimator 
  FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans    FDI  FDI equity  FPI debt  Loans 



























#  observations  34 34 34 34  #  observations  31 31 31 31 


























#  observations  34 34 34 34  #  observations  28 28 28 28 





























#  observations  33 33 33 33  #  observations  27 27 27 27 
R-squared  0.6712 0.5034 0.5159 0.3297  R–squared  0.6809 0.7435 0.7024 0.5492 
Note: The underlying econometric model is that of (2):  . The superscripted letters indicate for the pecking order hypothesis,  , that the respective 




j X μ λ κ α + + =
2 1
4 :
k k H λ λ =
F, different from that of equity portfolio investment for 
E, different from that of debt securities for 
D and different from that of loans for 
L.  
The estimator is a three-stage least-square (3SLS) one, where the instrument is settler mortality (in logs). 






















































We conduct various sensitivity tests to check for the robustness of these findings. For 
instance, we find very similar results when controlling also for GDP per capita in model (2). 
The stylised facts of Section 3 underline that there is a high correlation between per capita 
GDP and the pecking order of cross-border capital positions. However, the fact that the 
results hold also when controlling for GDP per capita stresses that market development and 
institutions have a large and significant effect on the pecking order independent of the level 
of development of a country. 
As a further important sensitivity test, we use an IV estimator to take into account the 
possibility that institutional arrangements and market development may be. We estimate the 
system using a three-stage least-squares estimator (3SLS), which in essence implies 
instrumenting the institutional variables. An additional advantage of this approach is that we 
also address potential measurement errors in the institutional variables with our estimation 
technique. We draw our instruments from the literature on law and finance and the literature 
on institutions and economic development. Specifically, we use legal origin dummies and 
dummies for religion which have been found to be important determinants of financial 
markets development and regulations (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1997, 
1998). In the case of institutions, we use the mortality of settlers from Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001). Our approach therefore also draws on Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozkan and 
Volosovych (2005).
23
The results for the 3SLS estimates are given in Tables 13 and 14. Overall, the key point is 
that the results are highly robust to those without instrumenting of the institutions. All the 
results described above are qualitatively identical when using 3SLS, underlining that portfolio 
investment is substantially more sensitive to institutions and market development than FDI, 
and to some extent also than loans. It is also reassuring to observe that with the IV estimates 
the effects on FDI turn significant, but remain significantly smaller than for portfolio 
investment. Moreover, the fact that the size of the coefficients and their significance increase 
somewhat also helps to stress the robustness of the results.
24
In summary, we find that market development and institutions are strongly related to the 
pecking order of cross-border investment. The key finding of this section is that portfolio 
investment, in particular in equity securities, is the type of capital that is the most sensitive to 
differences in market development/openness and the quality of host country institutions. A 
second key result is that FDI appears to be the type of capital that is most immune to the 
quality of domestic institutions. We find that FDI is least sensitive in all institutional 
categories, including with regard to transparency, investor protection, the degree of 
corruption and expropriation risk. 
6.   Conclusions 
Is there a pecking order of cross-border investment in that countries become financially 
integrated primarily through one type of investment rather than others? The perceived 
wisdom in much of the debate on financial integration and trade in financial assets is that FDI 
constitutes a type of investment that is desirable from a host country perspective because it 
                                                  
23   We recognise that the instruments, especially the legal code dummies, might be poor. However, it is 
reassuring that in general our instrument for institutions – settler mortality – passes over-identification tests. 
Moreover, it is by itself not significant and therefore excludable from the empirical model. 
24  Finally, we also find that the results are largely robust across country subsamples, ie when only analysing 
emerging markets/developing countries, with few qualitatively meaningful differences across these groups. 
Results are available upon request. 
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brings about a transfer of know-how, creates access to foreign markets and reduces the risks 
of financial distress. However, the facts of cross-border capital positions also show that 
countries that are richer have higher growth and that better institutions receive a higher share 
of their foreign investment in the form of portfolio investment and a much lower share through 
FDI and loans. 
The objective of this paper has been to analyse whether there is a natural pecking order in 
cross-border investment. We focus on the role of two key determinants for the trade in 
financial assets that have been central in this literature in recent years: the importance of 
information frictions, and the role of institutions. Recent theoretical contributions to this 
literature emphasise the importance of differences in the ownership structure of different 
forms of investment. In particular, FDI has stronger ownership implications and thus tends to 
be more information-sensitive than portfolio equity or debt investment. A second strand of the 
literature has focused on the implications of this theory for the role of institutions. One line of 
reasoning is that, due to the larger information sensitivity of FDI, it is also harder to 
expropriate and thus it may be more immune to differences in the quality of institutions and 
market development. 
The intended contribution of the paper is to test these hypotheses empirically for a broad set 
of countries. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides a comprehensive 
comparison of all four types of cross-border investment – distinguishing between FDI, 
portfolio equity securities, debt securities and loans. We develop and use a unique, 
combined data source of the capital stocks, rather than capital flows, for 77 countries.  
The empirical results are compelling and confirm our hypotheses on the pecking order of 
cross-border investment. First, information frictions across countries are an important 
determinant of the pecking order of cross-border capital positions. In line with the theory on 
the capital structure of the firm, we find that FDI, and to some extent loans, are the types of 
capital most sensitive to information frictions, whereas portfolio investment is much less 
responsive. The magnitude of these pecking order effects is large: FDI and loans are about 
1.5 to 2 times more sensitive to information frictions than equity and portfolio investment. 
This finding is robust to several sensitivity tests, including: the use of alternative proxies for 
information frictions; various specifications of the econometric model; controlling for other 
determinants, such as risk diversification; and across-country samples, both for industrialised 
and for emerging market economies.  
The second key result of the paper is that the degree of market development and the quality 
of host country institutions are important determinants of the pecking order of cross-border 
investment. We find that portfolio investment is substantially more sensitive than FDI and 
loans to both market development – such as the openness of the capital account and the 
development of the domestic financial sector – and to domestic institutional features. We use 
three proxies for the quality of institutions – the degree of transparency, investor protection 
and corruption – and show that this result is robust across all these different elements of host 
country institutions. These results confirm some hypotheses formulated in the literature but 
contradict others. For instance, in line with the argument by Albuquerque (2003), we find that 
FDI does not react to differences from the risk of expropriation, whereas portfolio equity and 
debt investment are highly sensitive to this risk. Similarly, we do not find that corruption has a 
more detrimental effect on FDI, as hypothesised in the literature, but that the magnitude of 
FDI is not sensitive to corruption, whereas portfolio investment is. This implies that, in fact, 
corruption tilts the composition of foreign investment significantly towards FDI, and to a 
lesser extent towards loans. 
The findings of the paper have a number of important policy implications. In particular, the 
empirical results indicate that a large share of foreign investment that takes the form of FDI – 
despite the various benefits FDI may ultimately entail – may not necessarily be a blessing, 
but may in fact also be a signal of some underlying weaknesses – either in terms of weak 
institutions or in terms of the poor functioning or underdevelopment of domestic financial 
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markets – of the host country. By contrast, a large share of foreign investment that comes 
through portfolio equity or debt securities is likely, at least in part, to signal well functioning 
domestic financial markets and the trust of foreign investors in domestic institutions. 
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A: Country sample 
EMEs and developing countries  Developed countries 




East Europe  Other 
Argentina Bangladesh  Bulgaria  Cote  d'Ivoire  Austria  Australia 
Bolivia China  Croatia  Egypt  Belgium  Canada 
Brazil Hong  Kong  Cyprus  Ghana  Denmark  Japan 
Chile  India  Czech Republic  Israel  Finland  New Zealand 
Colombia Indonesia Estonia  Kenya France  United  States 
Costa Rica  Kazakhstan  Hungary Morocco Germany   
Ecuador Korea  Latvia  Namibia Greece   
El Salvador  Malaysia  Lithuania  Nigeria  Iceland   
Guatemala Pakistan  Poland  South Africa  Ireland   
Honduras Philippines  Romania  Tanzania  Italy   
Jamaica Singapore  Russia  Tunisia  Netherlands   
Mexico Sri  Lanka  Slovenia  Zambia Norway   
Paraguay Vietnam  Turkey    Portugal   
Peru       Spain   
Trinidad & Tob.        Sweden   
Uruguay       Switzerland   




B: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable definition  Source 
Bilateral FDI stocks – FDI asset holdings of source country i in 
host country j in millions of US dollars 
UNCTAD 
Bilateral portfolio equity and portfolio debt stocks – average 
2001-2003 holdings of source country i in host country j in millions 
of US dollars 
Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS), IMF 
Bilateral loans – aggregate assets and aggregate liabilities of 
banks in reporting countries vis-à-vis banking and non-banking 
institutions in host countries  
International Locational 
Banking Statistics (ILB), BIS 
Distance – log bilateral great circle distance in miles between 
economic centres of source country and host country  
Andy Rose’s website 
Telephone traffic – volume of telephone call traffic between source 
and host country 
ITU Directions of Trade 
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Trade in newspapers and periodicals – exports from country i to 
country j plus exports from j to i in millions of US dollars 
UN Comtrade database 
Exports of item 8922 SITC 
Rev.2 
Bilateral stock of foreigners – sum of foreigners born in country i 
currently living in country j and vice versa 
OECD Database on Foreign-
born and Expatriates 
Common language – dummy equal to one if both countries speak 
the same language and zero otherwise 
Andy Rose’s website; CIA 
World Factbook 
Common legal origin – dummy equal to one if both countries have 
legal system with same origin and zero otherwise 
La Porta et al (1998) 
Colonial links – dummy equal to one if both countries have been 
linked through colonisation 
Andy Rose’s website; CIA 
World Factbook 
Trade agreement – dummy equal to one if both countries have a 
bilateral trade agreement or are part of a common agreement and 
zero otherwise 
Andy Rose’s website 
Investment treaty – dummy equal to one if both countries have a 
bilateral investment treaty and zero otherwise 
UNCTAD 
Bilateral trade – the imports of goods and services of host country 
from source country in millions of US dollars 
IFS, IMF 
GDP correlation – bilateral correlation of annual real GDP growth 
rates between host and source countries over the period 1960-2003 
IFS, IMF and OECD 
Capital account openness – dummy equal to one if the host 
country had fully liberalised its capital account by 1996 and zero 
otherwise 
Annual Report of Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER), IMF 
Financial development – credit to the private sector in USD 
millions 
IFS, IMF 
Stock market capitalization – average stock market capitalisation 
in USD millions over the period 1999-2003 
Datastream and national 
sources 
Quality of information disclosure – index that goes from 0 to 7 
with higher values indicating that regulation requires more 
disclosure of information (see source for more details) 
World Bank – Doing Business 
Database 
Accounting standards – rating of companies in seven different 
categories in 1990. The index goes from 0 to 100, with higher 
values representing better standards 
La Porta et al (1998) 
Property rights – index that goes from 0 to 5, with higher values 
representing bad protection of property rights 
Heritage Foundation 
Expropriation risk – index goes from 0 to 10, with high values 
representing low risk 
ICRG – PRS 
Repudiation risk – index goes from 0 to 10, with high values 
representing low risk 
ICRG – PRS 
Days of enforcement – the time taken to resolve a dispute – in 
calendar days – counted from the moment the plaintiff files the 
lawsuit until settlement or payment 
World Bank – Doing Business 
Database 
TI corruption – index goes from 0 to 10, with higher values 
indicating higher levels of corruption 
Transparency International 
(Wei, 2000b) 
WDR corruption – index goes from 1 to 8, with higher values 
indicating higher levels of corruption 
World Bank (Wei, 2000b) 
German exporters’ corruption index – survey-based index that 
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